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St. John's University School of Law 
Jones Act Seamen 
FL EET DOCTRINE APP LIES TO 
SH ORE-BASED RIGG ER 
WORKING ON BARG E 
Asserti ng the fleet docti ne, where p er­
manent assi gnment to group of vessels 
under common ownership can be 
shown, al lows a ri gger worki ng on 
floati ng p latforms to acqui re seaman 
status i n  a Jones Act acti on. 
(Gizoni v. Southwest Marine inc., CA9, 
56 F. 3d 1 138, 617195) 
Byron Gizoni (Gizoni), 
shore-based rigger and 
rigging foreman, was in­
jured when he stepped 
into a hole on the deck of 
Southwest Marine Inc.'s 
(Southwest's) floating 
pontoon barge or floating platform during 
repair of a U.S. Navy ship. The pontoon 
was secured to a floating dry dock being 
used to repair the ship's rudder. 
Southwest, Gizoni's employer, was sued 
under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 688, 
on the claim that Gizoni was a seaman be­
cause of his work aboard the barges and 
watercraft owned by Southwest Marine. 
Although the Jones Act provides an in­
jured seaman a cause of action in negli­
gence, it does not define seaman for pur­
poses of the Act. 
The district court found Gizoni to be a 
harbor worker and therefore precluded 
from suing under the Act, granting South­
west summary judgment. The court of ap­
peals reversed. The appeals court found 
that the lower court had erred in its in­
structions to the jury on the definition of 
"seaman." In its remand for a new trial, 
the appeals court held: (I) that the fleet 
doctrine instruction should have been 
given; (2) evidence that Gizoni had been 
employed on a vessel in navigation was 
not misleading; (3) the court's instruction 
defining a vessel was erroneous; but that 
(4) the "permanent connection" instruc­
tion was correct. 
Gizoni, the ninth circuit noted, had to 
show, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that he was a "seaman." According to the 
Bullis test, to prove one is a seaman, he 
must be (I) employed on a vessel that is in 
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navigation; (2) permanently connected 
to that vessel; and (3) contributing to 
the function of the mission of the ves­
sel. Bullis v. Twentieth Century-Fox 
Film Corp., 474 F.2d 392, 393 (9th 
Cir. 1973). 
Gizoni claimed that the district court 
had erred by not instructing the jury on 
the fleet sea doctrine. The fleet doc­
trine, created by the fifth circuit to 
lower the requirement that a seaman 
had to be permanently assigned to a 
vessel, allows one to acquire seaman 
status through permanent assignment 
among multiple vessels under one 
common ownership. Campo v. Elec­
tro-Coal Transfer Corp., 970 F.2d 5 1 ,  
52 (5th Cir. 1 992), cert. denied, 1 1 3 
S.Ct. 126 1 ,  1 22 L.Ed.2d 659 ( 1 993). 
The appellate court determined that the 
fleet doctrine was a reasonable exten­
sion of Jones Act precedent. The court 
considered evidence that Gizoni had 
worked on a variety of barges for 
Southwest. The fleet doctrine was also 
applicable, ironically, because South­
west, in its closing argument, focussed 
on the fact that Gizoni could not prove 
that he was "more or less permanently 
attached" to a particular barge. There­
fore, the district court clearly erred in 
not giving the instruction. 
The district court, argued Gizoni, also 
erred by instructing the jury that Gi­
zoni had to prove that the situs of the 
accident occurred on a vessel in navi­
gation. Under the Jones Act, a seaman 
may recover for any injury that oc­
curred in the course of employment. 
0 'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & 
Dock Co., 3 1 8  U.S. 36, 63 S.Ct. 488, 
87 L.Ed. 596 (1943). Thus, whether or 
not the injury occurred on a vessel is 
irrelevant. Yet, in contrast, the judge's 
instruction to the jury implied Gizoni 
had to establish that he was employed 
on a vessel in navigation to recover. 
Further, said Gizoni, the district court 
clearly erred in instructing the jury 
with the following: "If the transporta­
tion function, if any, of the floating 
platform was merely incidental to its 
other functions, the floating platform 
cannot be found to be a vessel. * * * 
[T]o be a vessel, the purpose of the 
floating platform must, to some rea­
sonable degree, be the transportation 
of passengers, cargo or equipment 
from place to place across navigable 
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waters." Gizoni v. Southwest Marine Corp., 
56 F.3d 1 1 38, 1 1 42 (9th Cir. 1995). 
The court of appeals stated in previous de­
cisions that unusual-looking craft, whose 
purpose is not the transportation of persons 
or things, can be considered vessels under 
the Jones Act. Estate of Wenzel v. Seaward 
Marine Services, 709 F.2d 1 326 (9th Cir. 
1 983). Hence, the district court's instruc­
tion regarding the transportation function 
was also erroneous. 
Finally, the plaintiff contended that, when 
the district judge instructed the jury, 
''[Gizoni] had to establish that he had a more 
or less permanent connection with the vessel 
* * * [,]" that this implied that he was re­
quired to spend most of his time on that par­
ticular barge. The appeals court did not find 
this statement misleading. According to the 
United States Supreme Court, "the key to 
seaman status is employment-related con­
nection to a vessel in navigation." McDer­
mott Jnt'l v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, Il l 
S.Ct. 807, 1 1 2 L.Ed.2d 866 ( 1 99 1 ). 
The purpose of the connection requirement 
is not intended to allow an individual who 
works for an isolated period protection un­
der the Jones Act, but to protect the seaman 
who serves aboard one particular vessel for 
a brief time. THOMAS 1. SCHOENBAUM, AD­
MIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 6-9, at 263 
(2d ed. 1 994). 
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IYRR Y ACH TING REG ULATIONS 
P REEMP T COLREG S 
In yacht col li si on case, findi ngs of Inter­
nati onal Jury p reemp t U. S. court's app li ­
cati on of Arti cl es 12 & 13 of the Conven­
ti on on Internati onal Regulati on for the 
P reventi on of Colli si ons at Sea 
( COLREG S). 
(Juno SRL v. SIV Endeavour, CAl, 58 
F.3d 1, 619195) 
On October 3, 1 992, two vessels, the 
Charles Jourdan and the Endeavour, were 
racing in the La Nioulargue Regatta in and 
around the Bay of St. Tropez. Although the 
yachts were racing on separate courses, the 
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